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Election Fairness and Government Legitimacy in Afghanistan*    
Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Clark Gibson, James D. Long, and Arman Rezaee 
	
Abstract:  
Elections provide a key potential means of creating state "legitimacy." One 
mechanism is by improving citizens’ attitudes toward government and so 
increasing their willingness to comply with rules and regulations. We investigate 
whether election fairness affects attitudes towards government in a fragile state. 
We find that a randomly assigned fraud-reducing intervention in Afghan elections 
leads to both improvement in two indexes, one on attitudes toward government, 
and another on compliance. The results imply that reducing electoral fraud can be 
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Half of the world’s extreme poor now live in fragile states, often with 
governments that lack popular legitimacy. 1  Correspondingly, international 
development efforts now increasing focus on strengthening weak or fragile states. 
Creating legitimacy, broadly defined as supporting citizen compliance and 
cooperation with governance, is an important step. Elections could help achieve 
this purpose. The general idea is to improve citizens’ attitudes toward institutions 
by making them more accountable and clearly supported by a fair electoral 
process. Many fragile countries lack core features of the Weberian state, such as a 
monopoly on violence, the capacity to correct market failures, and the ability to 
tax and provide services to the population. This both impedes economic 
development, and, in extreme cases, can lead to “ungoverned spaces” or “limited 
statehood” from which non-state groups can threaten local, regional, and global 
security. 2,3  One argument is that elections, by legitimating governments, can 
																																								 																				
1 Economists generally avoid the term legitimacy. Dewatripont and Roland (1992), an exception, 
use it to mean "agenda-setting authority, over the nature and sequence of proposals put to a vote." 
(p. 300), in the sense of Romer and Rosenthal (1979). They assume that the public complies 
(costlessly) with a government bringing proposals of tax, subsidy and reallocation, subject to a 
vote. What we mean by legitimacy is an attitude which induces compliance with laws and 
regulations, including taxation, and cooperation with security forces at low cost to government. 
See discussion below for details. 
2 Although the concept has driven US foreign policy, the term “ungoverned spaces” has a raft of 
critics. Krasner prefers “limited statehood” which means “those areas of a country in which central 
authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in 
which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking.” Krasner and Risse (2014), 
p.549. 
3
	There are several other competing hypotheses that have been offered to explain the development 
of states in the historical record, including: (i) the availability of resources, and the ease with 
which they can be extracted, determine the initial set of institutions (Diamond, 1998; Gallup et al, 
1999; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Acemoglu et al, 2001); (ii) natural terrain, and the military 
advantage it affords indigenous groups, make full colonization impractical in some regions 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Nunn and Puga, 2012); and (iii) it is both efficient, and easier, to 
maintain order in such regions through a system of indirect governance (Padrò I Miquel and 
Yared, 2012; Scott, 2009).  
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make it easier for governments to perform core functions, such as raising taxes 
and enforcing laws, because citizens are more willing to comply. 
In this paper, we test whether improving election fairness can induce 
improved attitudes, and in particular compliant attitudes, towards government. 
Our data come from a nationwide field experiment during the 2010 lower house 
(Wolesi Jirga) parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. We find that survey 
respondents in areas that held fairer elections—due to an experimental fraud 
reduction treatment—were both more likely to favorably view their government 
in general and more likely to hold compliant attitudes.4  We measure these 
attitudes using two indices, each aggregating responses to four and five 
statements. For example, citizens living near treated polling stations were more 
likely to report that (1) Afghanistan is a democracy and that (2) members of 
parliament provide services, two measures of general perceptions of government. 
On compliance, they were more likely to report that (3) paying taxes is somewhat 
or very important and that (4) one should report insurgent behavior to state 
security forces.5  
This study joins a group of experiments testing whether government 
service delivery can increase citizens’ support for the government in nascent 
democracies (Burde, Middleton, and Samii, 2016; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 
2012; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2009, 2012; Humphreys and Weinstein 
2012; Beath et al 2012). Separately, several experiments have attempted to 
improve electoral processes through direct observation (Callen and Long, 2015; 
Callen, Gibson, Jung, and Long, 2016; Hyde, 2007; Hyde 2009; Enikolopov et al 
																																								 																				
4 This paper, therefore, builds on a prior study reported in (Callen and Long, 2015). 
5 Importantly we find that these treatment effects are meaningful and significant for both our 
Perceptions of Government and Support for Government indices as well as an index that combines 
all 9 statements. We take these indices as our primary outcomes to assuage concerns about 
multiple hypothesis testing. 
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2013; Asunka et al 2014), generally finding improved electoral integrity. To our 
knowledge, however, ours is the first to link efforts to improve the fairness of 
national elections to attitudes toward government.6  
 According to a common view, legitimacy derives from a perception of 
procedural fairness (Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009; Tyler 1990, 2006; Paternoster, 
Brame, Bachman, and Sherman 1997; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Huo 
2002). Alternately, legitimacy may depend on policy outcomes, or the competent 
provision of public goods (Bernstein and Lü 2003; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000; 
Guyer 1992; O’Brien 2002; Levi 2006).  
 A minimalist definition of legitimacy, from the state-building literature, is 
this: an attribute of political authority which captures residents’ acceptance that 
state institutions have “the right to issue certain commands, and that they, in turn, 
have an obligation or duty to comply” (Lake 2010).7 This definition is especially 
appropriate for Afghanistan, where state institutions are weak and multiple actors 
compete for political authority (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013). Compliance is 
particularly important to state-building because it reduces governance costs for 
the state, costs that would be prohibitively expensive if all laws were enforced 
through direct observation and punishment. 
   
																																								 																				
6 Grossman and Baldassarri (2012) provide evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment that 
subjects electing their leaders contribute more in a public goods game and that the same 
relationship between the perceived legitimacy of authority and cooperation exists non-
experimentally in decisions related to the farmer cooperatives to which subjects belong.  
7 When this acceptance translates into actual compliance with an authority’s rules, it constitutes 




 With a few notable exceptions, discussions of legitimacy mainly reside in 
state-building, policy, and political science literatures.8 Yet this subject has clear 
connections to economic research on social cooperation (Rodrik 1999, 2000; 
Dixit et al 2000; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005), and on forces that undermine weak 
democracies (Padro-i-Miquel 2007). In addition, because the world’s extreme 
poor will primarily concentrated in fragile states in the years to come, state 
building will be increasingly important for development economics. 
Correspondingly, our goal in this paper is to devise an empirical test of 
whether electoral fairness contributes to attitudes of government legitimacy. In 
this sense, we are directly motivated by Lake (2010), which aims to use `positive 
definitions of legitimacy’ as a basis for bridging the gap between these other 
literatures and applied economics. Our survey questions are based directly on 
ideas from this literature. Our hope from the outset in designing this field 
experiment was that the monitoring intervention would reduce fraud, providing an 
opportunity to test whether it affected measures of legitimacy.  
Our finding that electoral fairness affects attitudes is of potential interest 
for three reasons. First, Afghans had plenty of reasons to be cynical about their 
government that summer; the elections were held in a setting fraught with vote-
rigging, by what is by all accounts one of the world’s most corrupt and 
dysfunctional governments. It is remarkable, therefore, that attitudes were plastic. 
The intervention we used was also highly cost-effective relative to traditional 
election monitoring and was suited to implementation during a violent election 
(Callen and Long, 2015), and has been used to fight fraud in South Africa, Kenya, 
and in more recent elections in Afghanistan We successfully visited 471 polling 
																																								 																				
8 Exceptions include Romer and Rosethal (1979), Dewatripont and Roland (1992), Fearon, 
Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009), Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012). 
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centers, with a budget of just over US$100,000. By contrast, the largest foreign 
mission during this election reached about 85 polling centers, spanning much less 
of the country, with a budget of approximately US$10 million.  
Second, these results challenge the view that Afghan political opinion 
operates solely along pre-existing ethnic, class, religious, or ideological lines. 
Instead, these results suggest that citizens themselves believe that democratic 
reforms could have real political effects, even in a country with weak institutions 
and a history of informal governance outside of the formal central state. 
Third, in this setting compliance with the critical needs of security forces, 
including the need for information about insurgent activities, could be critical to 
the very survival of government.9 
When considering these reasons, it is important to acknowledge that our 
attitude measures are based on stated preference survey questions, and so may not 
reflect respondents’ true beliefs and thus the real actions they might take. 
However, multiple literatures document the link between stated preference 
questions similar to those in our survey and important economic outcomes. One 
literature links stated responses to surveys on cultural norms, such as the World 
Value Survey, to real-world outcomes such as conflict, public good provision, and 
work and fertility decisions (Fortin 2005, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; 
																																								 																				
9 Berman et al (2011) summarizes this literature: “Mao Tse-Tung (1937) famously describes the 
people as “the sea in which rebels must swim,” a perspective reinforced by a generation of 
twentieth-century counterinsurgency theorists (Trinquier 1961; Galula 1964; Taber 1965; 
Clutterbuck 1966; Thompson 1966; Kitson 1977). Twenty-first century scholarship by 
practitioners of counterinsurgency reinforces the enduring relevance of noncombatants (Sepp 
2005; Petraeus 2006; Cassidy 2008; McMaster 2008). The most prevalent explanation for the 
importance of garnering popular support is that parties to insurgent conflicts use it to gain critical 
information and intelligence. Kalyvas (2006) demonstrates that this information increases the 




Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin and Wacziarg 2017). Additionally, a recent study finds that 
the stated views of Pakistani men towards the United States correlate with both 
their revealed anti-Americanism in the lab setting as well as their actual political 
affiliation with a more anti-American political party (Bursztyn, Callen, Ferman, 
Gulzar, Hasanain, and Yuchtman 2016). Finally, drawing from multiple sources, 
Berman, Felter, and Shapiro (forthcoming) document that survey based measures 
of civilian attitudes towards government  (including willingness to share tips with 
authorities) respond to violence suffered by civilians the same way that 
subsequent attacks on government forces do. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our research 
questions, providing a basis for multiple hypothesis testing adjustments. Section 3 
describes the context and why it is suited to examining questions of state 
legitimacy. Section 4 describes our data and research strategy. Section 5 provides 
results and section 6 concludes. 
2. Research questions 
We seek to contribute to prior studies by answering the research questions: 
(i) does enhancing the fairness of elections improve legitimacy through improved 
perceptions of government? and (ii) does enhancing the fairness of elections 
improve legitimacy through more compliant behavior towards government? 
 While we seek to distinguish between legitimacy related to perceptions of 
government and compliant behavior towards government, our specific survey 
questions may straddle the concepts. As such, in addition to answering these two 
research questions separately, we answer the more general: does enhancing the 




Our questions stem from several lines of research. The first argues that the 
source of legitimacy may be procedural. Consider an election in a nascent or 
conflict-affected state, where the legitimacy of governance might be questioned. 
Proponents of early elections after civil wars argue that establishing elected 
authorities allows for a more peaceful way for parties to compete for office, thus 
increasing the possibility that a country will consolidate as a democracy 
(Diamond 2006). Even if poorly run or beset with violence, elections may allow 
leaders and voters to begin the practice of democratic choice and ultimately lead 
to better future elections (Berman 2007; Carothers 2007; Lindberg 2003). The 
promise of elections may also induce the international community to commit 
peacekeeping forces and development assistance necessary to help legitimize a 
fragile post conflict government (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Lyons 
2002).10 
A second literature argues that residents may confer legitimacy on an 
authority based on their assessment of outcomes, such as public service delivery 
and overall economic and political performance (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; 
Gilley 2009; Levi 1988, 1997; Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009; Rothstein 2005; 
																																								 																				
10 Despite the important role that elections may serve in establishing legitimacy, the evidence is 
mixed. Recent research identifies many problems associated with holding elections in post-
conflict environments. Brancati and Snyder (2011) find that calling for an election too soon is 
associated with an increased likelihood of renewed fighting. A quick election may increase the 
probability that one side or the other will ignore a loss at the ballot box and return to war, or may 
result in an elected government which pursues policies that impede further reform and instead 
rekindle conflict (Brancati and Snyder 2011; de Zeeuw 2008; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Paris 
2004). Further, early elections are often fraudulent for a number of reasons, including the interests 
of those staging the elections, a lack of trustworthy electoral institutions, and the disorganization 
of the opposition (Bjornlund 2004; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2011). Elections in societies divided along 
racial, ethnic, or other social lines are also more likely to produce immoderate campaigns, 
violence, and breakdown (Snyder 2000; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Indeed, 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008) find no evidence that elections in post conflict 
environments reduce the risk of further war, and instead should be “promoted as intrinsically 




Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; van De Walle and Scott 2009). To build outcome 
legitimacy, foreign governments, policymakers, and international organizations 
concerned with state-building in post conflict areas have demonstrated a strong 
interest in helping nascent governments establish the competent delivery of basic 
services to their citizens (Bately and McLoughlin 2010; Beath et al 2012; 
Carment et al 2010; Paris and Sisk 2009; Cole and Hsu 2009). If an authority 
cannot provide goods and services, individuals may turn to other groups that can, 
including insurgents, international military forces (especially to provide security), 
and/or non-governmental organizations (Berman 2009; Brinkerhoff et al 2009; 
OECD 2010; Vaux and Visman 2005). 
Regardless of their source, attitudes toward government play an important 
role in public economics. The concept of "tax morale"—a social norm of 
voluntary compliance with taxation, reducing costs of enforcement—links 
directly to ideas of legitimacy in political science. A recent survey (Luttmer and 
Singhal 2014) demonstrates the importance of the phenomenon. For instance, US 
firms owned by individuals from low tax morale countries are much less likely to 
pay their US taxes. (Yet experiments in improving attitudes toward tax 
compliance have yielded mixed results.) A parallel literature in criminology finds 
that voluntary compliance with law enforcement similarly allows improved 
effectiveness, especially in a community policing setting (Bayley, 1994; Akerlof 
and Yellen 1994; Kennedy et al 2001 (p. 10)). The literature on asymmetric 
insurgency has even higher stakes—it emphasizes the importance of civilian 
attitudes favoring either government or rebels as decisive in conflict outcomes 
(Mao 1937), deciding whether the government will survive at all. In that setting, 
as in the tax morale and community policing literature, a key policy question is 
the pliability of attitudes (Berman and Matanock 2015). 
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Whether the source of legitimacy is based on procedures or outcomes, and 
regardless of mechanism, the fairness of elections can potentially enhance it. 
Elections allow individuals to choose their leaders through a procedure that hews 
to clear and impartial rules. A well-organized and implemented election---which 
is inherently public---might signal that the government is more likely to capably 
produce public services. Moreover, a fair election may select and incentivize 
politicians more answerable to the public on outcomes. Fairness may play an 
indirect role, since compliant attitudes allow governance with less (expensive) 
coercion, leaving more resources to spend on public goods.  
3. Background to Afghanistan’s 2010 Wolesi Jirga election 
Promoting elections has been a core component of the United States’ policy in 
Afghanistan. After the US invasion and the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Coalition 
forces immediately began developing democratic institutions, hoping to promote 
stability by establishing a functioning central government that had been 
undermined by two previous decades of internecine conflict, civil war, and 
Taliban rule. Soon after the invasion, Coalition forces empaneled a Loya Jirga to 
create a new constitution. In 2005, Afghans voted in the first elections for the 
lower house of parliament (Wolesi Jirga). In 2009, Hamid Karzai won re-election 
as president amid claims of rampant election fraud (Callen and Weidmann 2013). 
General Stanley McChrystal, in an official communication to President Obama 
requesting troops to support a “surge,” expressed his belief that the failure of the 
2009 elections created a “crisis of confidence” in the government, which would 
ultimately undermine the war effort without more troops (McChrystal 2009).  
 We study the effects of a fraud-reducing intervention implemented during 
the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections, which occurred amid a growing insurgency and a 
U.S. commitment to begin withdrawing troops in July 2011. The international 
10	
	
community viewed these elections as a critical benchmark in the consolidation of 
democratic institutions given doubts about the Karzai government's ability to 
exercise control in much of the country and the growing influence of the Taliban. 
Despite a direct threat of violence, roughly five million voters (about 37 percent 
of those registered) cast ballots on election day.  
 Afghanistan's 34 provinces serve as multi-member districts that elect 
members of the Wolesi Jirga. Each province is a single electoral district. The 
number of seats allocated to a province is proportional to its estimated population. 
Candidates run “at large” within the province, without respect to any smaller 
constituency boundaries. Voters cast a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) for 
individual candidates, nearly all of whom run as independents. 11  Winning 
candidates are those who receive the most votes relative to each province's seat 
share. For example, Kabul province elects the most members to Parliament (33) 
and Panjsher province the fewest (2). The candidates who rank one through 33 in 
Kabul and one through two in Panjsher win seats to the Wolesi Jirga. 
SNTV rules create strong incentives for fraud. SNTV with large district 
magnitudes and a lack of political parties creates a wide dispersion of votes across 
candidates. The vote margins separating the lowest winning candidate from the 
highest losing candidate are thus often small. This creates a high expected return 
for even small manipulation for many candidates. (In contrast, electoral systems 
with dominant parties guarantee victory with large vote margins, and so non-
viable candidates are less likely to rig results.) These strong incentives to 
manipulate voting were compounded by a weak election commission, which had 
failed to prevent widespread fraud during the 2009 presidential election. We 
																																								 																				
11 SNTV systems provide voters with one ballot that they cast for one candidate or party when 
multiple candidates run for multiple seats. If a voter's ballot goes towards a losing candidate, the 
vote is not re-apportioned. 
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document clear evidence of election fraud in the experimental sample studied in 
this paper during the 2010 parliamentary contest.  
4. Research design and data 
The results in this paper use data from a randomized evaluation of an original 
anti-fraud monitoring package that we conducted during Afghanistan’s 2010 
Wolesi Jirga election (Callen and Long, 2015), and which we recount here. In this 
section, we revisit that anti-fraud monitoring experiment as a prelude to our 
investigation of the effect of that fraud reduction on measures of support for the 
Afghan government.  This paper, therefore, describes a downstream experiment 
focused on the effects of the anti-fraud intervention on attitudes toward 
government.  
On election day, and again on the day after, a team of Afghan researchers 
traveled to an experimental sample of 471 polling centers (7.8 percent of polling 
centers operating on election day).12 Because Afghanistan was an active war zone 
during this period, we selected polling centers that met three criteria to ensure the 
safety of our staff: (i) achieving the highest security rating given by the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP); (ii) being located in provincial centers, which are much safer than rural 
areas;13 and (iii) being scheduled to operate on election day by the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC). Figure 1 maps our experimental sample. 
																																								 																				
12 We stratified treatment on province and, in the 450 polling centers for which we had baseline 
data (we added an additional 21 to the experimental sample after baseline on obtaining additional 
funding), we also stratified treatment on the share of respondents from the baseline survey 
reporting at least occasional access to electricity and on respondents reporting that the district 
governor carries the most responsibility for keeping elections fair. 
13 Given budget and security issues, we could only deploy researchers in 19 of 34 provincial 
centers. Thus the sample is not nationally representative but biased towards safer areas. Our 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
In a randomly chosen 238 of those polling centers, researchers delivered a 
letter to Polling Center Managers (PCMs) between 10AM and 4PM, during 
voting. Researchers then visited all 471 polling centers the following day to 
photograph the publicly posted election returns forms. 14  The letter delivery 
constituted the experimental treatment. The letter announced to PCMs that 
researchers would photograph election returns forms the following day 
(September 19) and that these photographs would be compared to results certified 
by the IEC. Neither treatment nor control sites would be affected by measurement 
the day after the election, as polling staff were absent. Figure 2 provides a copy of 
the letter in English (an original in Dari is attached as Figure 3). PCMs were 
asked to acknowledge receipt by signing the letter. PCMs at seventeen polling 
centers (seven percent of centers receiving letters) refused to sign. A polling 
center was designated as treated if the PCM received a letter (Letter Delivered = 
1).15  
 To measure the fairness of the election, researchers also investigated 
whether election materials were stolen or damaged during polling. We also 
examined the reason that materials went missing. Our field staff were careful to 
investigate irregularities by interviewing local community members while not 
engaging IEC staff, so as not to create an additional treatment. We received 
reports of candidate agents stealing or damaging materials at 62 (13 percent) of 
the 465 operating polling centers, a clear violation of the law. We define Election 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 					
sample does however cover each of Afghanistan’s regions, including those with a heavy Taliban 
presence. See Figure 1.  
14 Of 471 polling centers, six did not open on election day. We drop these from our analysis. 
15 Results below are robust to redefining treatment as both receiving and signing a letter. 
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Returns Form Removed as an indicator equal to one if materials were reported 
stolen or damaged by a candidate agent at a given polling center. 
 We have several reasons to think that stealing or damaging tallies reflects 
an intention to manipulate the ballot aggregation process. Many of the Electoral 
Complaints Commission (ECC) complaints reported in (Callen and Long, 2015) 
speculated that the purpose of stealing materials was to take them to a separate 
location, alter them, and then reinsert them into the counting process. 
Alternatively, candidates might seek to destroy all evidence of the polling center 
count, and then manufacture an entirely new returns form at the Provincial 
Aggregation Center.  
These activities also could plausibly send a signal to communities in the 
vicinity of the polling center regarding the fairness of the election. Figure 4 
provides a picture of citizens looking at tally sheet depicting the polling 
outcomes.   
 The treatment (i.e., delivery of a notification letter) induced dramatic 
reductions in three separate measures of fraud: the removal or defacement of a 
required provisional vote tally return form (Election Returns Form Removed); 
votes for candidates likely to be engaged in fraud based on their political 
connections16 (Votes); and that same candidate gaining enough votes to rank 
among the winning candidates in that polling station (Enough Votes to Win 
Station).	 Table 1 reports estimates of the effect of treatment on these three 
measures, reproducing results reported in (Callen and Long, 2015), adjusted to 
include only the sample of polling centers where we conducted our post-election 
																																								 																				
16 The political connections of candidates were coded in advance. We surmised that a connection 
to a provincial polling aggregator was a predictor of engagement in fraud. See (Callen and Long, 
2015) for details. 
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survey. Treatment reduced the damaging and theft of forms by about 11 
percentage points (columns 1 - 3), votes for candidates likely to be engaged in 
fraud (Treat x Provincial Aggregator Connection = 1) by about seven (columns 4 
– 6) and the likelihood that those candidates would rank among winning 
candidates by about 11 percentage points (columns 7 – 9). These results represent 
large treatment effects of the intervention on measures of fraud. They suggest that 
other types of highly visible electoral malfeasance (deviations from the counting 
protocol, early closings of polling centers, etc.) may similarly have been reduced. 
It is therefore plausible that the treatment changed the polling process in ways that 
are clearly visible to citizens.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The Post-Election Survey 
To measure the effect of increased election fairness on attitudes toward 
government, the focus of this paper, we combine the results of the letter 
intervention with data from a post-election survey. We conducted the survey in 
December 2010, roughly three months after the election, deliberately timing field 
activities to be immediately after the Independent Election Commission certified 
final results. This timing ensured that election outcomes would be both finalized 
and still potentially salient in the minds of voters. Respondents came from 
households living in the immediate vicinity of 450 of the 471 polling centers in 
our experimental sample, for a total of 2,904 respondents. To obtain a 
representative sample of respondents living near polling centers---generally 
neighborhood landmarks such as mosques, schools or markets---enumerators 
employed a random walk pattern starting at the polling center, with random 
selection of every fourth house or structure until either six or eight subjects had 
been surveyed. In keeping with Afghan custom, men and women were 
15	
	
interviewed by field staff of their own gender. Respondents within households 
were randomly selected using Kish grid. The survey had 50 percent female 
respondents. Enumerators conducted the survey in either Dari or Pashto. 
 We measure attitudes toward government using individuals’ responses to 
nine questions. The first four questions (1 through 4 below) probe attitudes that 
might contribute to outcome legitimacy due to positive perceptions of 
government; the remaining five questions (5 through 9 below) measure attitudes 
directly related to compliance with governance. We use four and five questions 
respectively to our primary two research questions since any single question is 
unlikely to fully capture citizen’s attitudes completely. We also use all nine 
questions to answer our third more general research question.17 In all three cases, 
we design indices following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and Casey, 
Glennerster, and Miguel (2012)—we standardize outcomes by subtracting their 
mean and dividing by their standard deviation so that all outcomes are measured 
in standard deviation units. Indices are then simply the arithmetic average of the 
standardized outcomes within each hypothesis.18 
1. Who is mainly responsible for delivering services in your neighborhood 
(RANDOMIZE ORDERING): the central government, your Member of 
Parliament, religious or ethnic leaders, the provincial government, or the 
community development council?  
																																								 																				
17 We did not specify these two sets of outcomes in a registered pre-analysis plan, although we 
designed these survey questions to measure the effect of election fraud on attitudes related to 
legitimacy. The timing of the survey (immediately after election outcomes were certified) and its’ 
content (principally questions on attitudes toward government) should also indicate that our intent 
was to measure attitudes related to legitimacy of government.  
18 We have also weighted these indices according to the covariance of the standardized outcomes 
within each index. No results in the paper change meaningfully in terms of magnitude or 
significance from such weighting. 
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The variable MP Provides Services is equal to one if individuals responding 
“Member of Parliament” to this question. This question is intended to capture 
whether or not an individual links service provision to a possibly legitimate 
elected government official who was voted on in this particular election, rather 
than more traditional local religious or ethnic leaders and rather than other bodies 
that are largely unelected and whose legitimacy should not be as directly affected 
by the 2010 elections—the central government, provincial government, and 
community driven councils.19  
2. In your opinion, is Afghanistan a democracy or not a democracy? 
Afghanistan is a Democracy is an indicator equal to one for individuals 
responding “is a democracy” to this question. This question could be interpreted 
by respondents narrowly, in the technical sense of democratic procedures being 
followed, or broadly as a positive endorsement of government. We cautiously 
chose the latter interpretation. 
3. Do you think that voting leads to improvements in the future or do you believe 
that no matter how one votes, things never change? 
Voting Improves Future is an indicator equal to one for individuals responding 
“improvements” to this question. This measure aims to capture whether citizens 
believe that voting materially impacts their future. If the government is viewed as 
incompetent, or elections are viewed as hopelessly marred by fraud and 
mismanagement, then citizens should not hold this belief.  
																																								 																				
19  Note that the “central government” is generally understood to be the unelected central 




4. Does the central government do an excellent, good, just fair or poor job with 
the money it has to spend on services? 
Gov. Ext. or Good Job of Prov. Serv. Is an indicator equal to one for individuals 
responding “excellent” or “good” to this question. This question directly assesses 
whether citizens believe the government is effectively providing services, a 
hallmark of any government that will be viewed as legitimate.  
5. In your opinion, how important is it for you to share information about 
insurgents to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (for example, pending 
IED attacks or the location of weapons caches): is it very important, somewhat 
important, or not at all important? 
Important to Report IED to ANSF is an indicator equal to one for individuals 
responding “very Important” or “somewhat Important” to this question. The 
question is intended to measure whether or not citizens comply with ANSF 
requests for information, a critical component of the ANSF’s ability to provide 
security to a highly vulnerable and war-torn population. A substantial policy and 
research literature related to counterinsurgency argues that citizens’ support for 
the government, and, consequently, their willingness to undertake the costly 
action of providing information to government forces, crucially determines who 
wins intrastate conflicts (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2011).    
If you had a dispute with a neighbor, who would you trust to settle it 
(RANDOMIZE ORDERING): head of family, police, courts, religious leaders, 
shura, elders, ISAF, or other? 
Police Should Resolve Disputes is an indicator equal to one for individuals 
responding “police” to this question. This question reflects compliance with 
police adjudication of disputes, as opposed to informal dispute adjudication 
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mechanisms (which might include the Taliban). Courts are in principle another 
relevant institution, but much less so in Afghanistan, because they essentially do 
not exist in much of the country.  
Nonetheless, we consider the potential relevance of courts, defining Courts 
Should Resolve Disputes as an indicator equal to one for individuals responding 
“courts” to this question. 
8. In your opinion, how important is it for you to pay taxes to the government: is it 
very important, somewhat important, or not at all important? 
Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't is an indicator equal to one for individuals 
responding “very important” or “somewhat important” to this question. More than 
any other question, voluntarily willingness to pay taxes is a critical measure of 
citizens support for the government (and reflection of whether they view the 
government as legitimate). This directly measures whether they voluntarily 
comply with a government rule that otherwise would be impossibly costly for the 
government to enforce.  
9. Let us suppose that your friend has been accused of a crime. Who do you trust 
to determine whether your friend is guilty: head of your qawm or the Afghan 
government? 
Trust Afg. Gov. to Determine Guilt is an indicator equal to one for individuals 
responding “Afghan government” to this question. This measures whether citizens 
trust the government to make costly determinations regarding a persons 
innocence.  
[Table 2 about here] 
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Table 2 reports summary statistics for these variables from the post-
election survey. The data depict a country with uneven support for government. 
About 67 percent of respondents view Afghanistan as a democracy, while only 18 
percent prefer the police as their primary means of dispute adjudication. 20 
percent of respondents believe that the Member of Parliament is responsible for 
providing services, while 93 percent respond that reporting an impending attack to 
the ANSF is important.20 61 believe voting will improve their future, 83.6 percent 
believe that paying taxes is somewhat or very important, and 53 percent would 
trust the Afghan government to determine the guilt of a friend.  
 In Table 2, we also find a high incidence of electoral malpractice at the 
polling stations linked to survey respondents. At 13.5 percent of polling stations 
our staff recorded a report of candidate agents removing tallies (Election Results 
Form Removed). A similar picture emerges from the baseline interviews, 
collected in August 2010, which we return to below.21 Our data also include two 
important descriptors of the environment that the elections were held in: the 
number of local military events tracked as by International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) (from their Combined Information Data Network Exchange 
(CIDNE) database), with a mean of 2.5; and whether or not the polling station 
was visited by an international monitor on election day, which occurred in 16.3 
percent of the sample (from Democracy International). 
																																								 																				
20 For ease of exposition, we restrict our sample in Tables 2 through 5 to respondents who provide 
some response to the nine questions used across our two hypotheses. This keeps the number of 
observations fixed across outcomes. Results without this restriction are reported in Appendix 
Tables 2 through 5. There are no meaningful differences. Furthermore, Appendix Table 1 reports 
that there is no differential attrition by treatment status into the restricted sample used in Tables 2 
through 5. 
21 Similar to the endline survey, we sampled respondents for the baseline, enumerators were told 
to begin at the polling center and survey either 6 or 8 subjects. Surveys were conducted in 
individuals’ homes. Enumerators adhered to the right hand rule random selection method and 
respondents within houses were selected according to a Kish grid (Kish, 1949). 
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   [Table 3 about here] 
 Table 3 reports summary statistics and verifies balanced randomization of 
our anti-fraud intervention between treatment and control polling stations, using 
our baseline survey of August 2010. Treatment status is balanced across baseline 
measures for all key outcomes used in the study including our nine key outcomes 
examined in Tables 4 and 5, which we expect given random assignment to 
treatment.22 We find no evidence of imbalance on other measures that might be 
relevant to attitudes, including military events in the vicinity and visits by 
international monitors. We note that our pre-election and post-election survey are 
not longitudinal but rather a repeated cross-section of surveys in the same 
neighborhoods. We did not collect identifying information from respondents 
because of the sensitive nature of the question and general concerns about having 
enumerators transport such information. Baseline balance on our key outcomes of 
interest, while not necessarily for the same sample of respondents, supports the 
argument that the change in attitudes results from treatment.    
5. Estimation Strategy and Results 
Assignment to treatment is random. So the following equation consistently 
estimates the effect of delivering the letter (which alerts the polling station 
manager of monitoring) on our measures of attitudes: 
Attitudeic = γ1 + γ2LetterDeliveredc + γ3Xic + εic 
																																								 																				
22 The only exception is that we did not collect baseline data for the “Trust Afghan Government to 
Determine Guilt” question in the baseline. For reasons of safety, we did not collect identifying 
information from our subjects so the respondents in our post-election (December 2010) survey are 
likely to not be the same respondents as in our pre-election (August 2010) survey. The same 
sampling protocol was maintained across both waves. We therefore view baseline balance on our 
key outcome measures as an additional indication that the measured treatment effect is not due to 
pre-existing differences between the treatment and control samples.  
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where i denotes an individual respondent, c indexes a polling center (specifically, 
the neighborhood in the immediate vicinity of the polling center), attitudes are 
measured as described in the discussion of Table 2 above, LetterDeliveredc is an 
indicator equal to one for polling centers that received the letter and Xic is a 
vector of covariates described in Table 2. All specifications reflect our assignment 
strategy, by including stratum dummies as suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie 
(2009).23 All regressions cluster standard errors at the polling center level. 
     [Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports our main results, testing whether notification letters 
improved (i) perceptions of government, (ii) compliant attitudes towards 
government, and (iii) attitudes towards government in general. Since assignment 
of the fraud-reducing treatment is randomized, we are not concerned with 
selection bias or other omitted variable biases driving our results. 
We answer all three research questions in the affirmative. Columns (1), we 
find notification letters improved perceptions of government by 0.054 standard 
deviations. This result is statistically significant and robust to the addition of a 
broad set of controls, as reported in columns (2) and (3) (as expected with random 
assignment to treatment). In columns (4), we similarly find notification letters 
improved compliant behiavior towards government by 0.068 standard deviations. 
It is not surprising then that we find a 0.062 standard deviation increase in general 
attitudes when using the All Outcomes Index. 
																																								 																				
23 Alternatively, we have tried collapsing our data to polling center level averages to create a 
pseudo-panel of polling centers. This allows us to run a difference-in-difference version of the 
same estimating equation, but with polling center fixed effects, where the first difference is 
between treatment and control polling centers and the second difference is between baseline and 
endline. We find very similar results taking this approach (results available on request). This is not 
surprising, given the high degree of balance we find on baseline outcomes in Table 3.  
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 Table 5 reports the results of estimating standardized treatment effects for 
our three indices as well as for each attitude individually. In addition to reporting 
treatment effects, we report multiple hypothesis-adjusted p-values for each 
hypothesis test. We adjust across the two primary Hypotheses H1 and H2 indices 
to control the familywise error rate (FWER) computed following Westfall and 
Young (1993) and Anderson (2008); within each hypothesis group, we adjust to 
control the false discovery rate (FDR) computed following Benjamini, Krieger 
and Yekutieli (2006) and Anderson (2008). We find that in the case of all nine 
outcomes, the estimated treatment effect is positive. This effect remains 
significant or very close (0.11) with adjusted p-values in three cases---MP 
Provides Services,24 Impt to Rept IED to ANSF, and Paying Taxes is Some. or 
Very Imp't. We view these outcome-level results as exploratory and thus will not 
interpret them individually. 
[Table 5 about here] 
All told, we find strong experimental evidence that the fraud-reduction 
intervention improves attitudes toward government. Taken together, these results 
indicate that even in a nascent democracy with weak institutions such as 
Afghanistan, improving electoral fairness has consequential effects on such 
attitudes. 
																																								 																				
24 We also estimated treatment effects on dummy variables set equal to one when respondents 
indicate supporting the Central Government, Provincial Government, religious or ethnic leaders, 
or local Community Development Council as the unit that should provide services. These results 
can be found in Appendix Table 6. The only significant positive effect is on indicating Member of 
Parliament. There is also significant negative treatment effect on indicating the Provincial 
Government. This negative effect is not surprising since these choices are exclusive—there is a 
simple adding up constraint. We might be more concerned if the negative treatment effect on 
Central Government offsets the positive effect on MPs if people might think of the Central 
Government and MPs as interchangeable. However, if we combine these two indicators, the result 




Does Enhanced Fairness Improve Attitudes if Perceived As A Result of External 
Intervention? 
Last, we explore whether the effect of election fairness on attitudes is 
negated if the external nature of the intervention is observed by respondents. One 
might imagine that an intervention known to be external (and therefore 
temporary) should not change attitudes. Voters would not confer more legitimacy 
on their government if they believed that a non-governmental actor, such as 
foreign election monitors or foreign donors, contributed to fair and competent 
administration of the election. Furthermore, they might also turn to government 
less for services should they perceive that it was a non-governmental actor that 
facilitated fair and competently administered elections. 
Our survey asked respondents if they had knowledge of the researcher 
team or their actions in providing the letter treatment. About 7 percent responded 
that they were aware. Appendix Table 7 repeats the analysis of Table 4, 
estimating the same equation with an added indicator variable Aware of 
Deliveryic, which takes the value one if the respondent is in the treated sample and 
responded that they had knowledge about the treatment.  
We do not find that being aware of delivery negates the treatment effect 
found on all three indices. Of course, these estimates are not experimental, since 
awareness was not randomly assigned within the treatment group. They are 
subject to possible selection bias, since those aware of treatment might have a 
priori different outcomes. That would be true, for instance, if the aware were keen 
observers of local politics and were therefore more cynical about Afghan 
democracy. In addition, there are no means to identify the comparison group in 





We have presented experimental evidence showing that attitudes toward 
government are not set in stone. Electoral fraud is associated with worse attitudes 
toward government, and in particular with less compliant attitudes. Reducing 
electoral fraud causally improves attitudes toward government in general –
suggesting enhanced legitimacy, and causally improves stated attitudes towards 
compliant behavior. These findings are new to the literature and are potentially 
compelling given the setting: even in an extremely fragile context, with a raging 
insurgency and with an ineffective government rife with corruption, electoral 
fairness seems to contribute to state legitimacy in Afghanistan, and, to the extent 
that information is a vital asset for forces fighting the insurgency, it may 
contribute to the very survival of that government. 
These findings speak both to policy and to the study of legitimacy in 
nascent democracies. From a policy perspective, our results reinforce the notion 
that domestic legitimacy, and therefore the stability of government, can be 
enhanced by interventions that improve the fairness of elections, an assumption 
that undergirds the current emphasis the international community places on 
holding elections in fragile states and the considerable investments it makes to 
ensure electoral integrity. 
Our results cannot provide guidance on how fair elections must be in order 
to legitimize a government, when compared to the counterfactual of no elections 
(Höglund et al 2009). Electoral processes in these contexts frequently suffer fraud 
(Bjornlund 2004; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2011), can incite violence (Horowitz 1985; 
Hyde and Marinov 2012; Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004), and may institutionalize 
former combatants into uncompromising political parties. In such circumstances, 
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staging unfair elections in an attempt to increase state legitimacy may instead 
undermine it. That remains an important question for future research.  
 Legitimacy plays a key role in theories of political development. It must 
also be relevant for understanding economic development: the government’s 
ability to impose rules is a necessary precondition for taxation, service provision, 
protection of human rights, enforcement of property rights, correcting market 
failures, and the implementation of development programs. Assuming that this 
authority can be expressed without cost is a glaring weakness of conventional 
models. Measuring attitudes towards compliance with that authority, and 
exploring interventions that improve those attitudes is a first step toward 
correcting that weakness. 
These findings show that at least some attitudes toward government are 
plastic: though they may be built on a base of unconditional loyalties (e.g., 
ideological, religious, or ethnic), attitudes are affected by citizens’ perceptions of 
the integrity of elections. That mechanism may be due to procedural fairness 
affecting attitudes directly, or to an expectation that fair elections will induce 
better governance---outcome legitimacy. Our evidence cannot adjudicate between 
those possibilities. Future experiments which enhance election integrity might 
attempt to do so. 
Along these lines, future research might explore the cost-effectiveness of 
electoral fraud reduction in improving attitudes, as compared to interventions that 
improve other aspects of service delivery or governance in fragile states. 
Enhancing policing, justice, health, education, security, or other basic services 
should increase legitimacy, according to theories of outcome legitimacy. Yet 
fraud reduction in elections is a remarkably low cost approach to conferring 
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legitimacy, compared to expensive interventions such as security force assistance 
and large infrastructure projects.25 
																																								 																				
25  On this note, our fraud-reduction intervention is remarkably inexpensive, and has been 
successfully replicated in two subsequent elections. (Callen and Long, 2015) report results from 
the first experiment, and Callen, Gibson, Jung, and Long, 2016 report results from the replication 
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Table 1: Effect of Treatment on Fraud - Three Measures 
Dependent Variable: 




Enough Votes to Win Station (=1) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Letter Treatment (=1) -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.111*** 
 
-0.039 0.008 0.026 
 
0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) 
 
(0.192) (0.046) (0.048) 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
           
     Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1) 
  
23.318*** 20.624*** 20.622*** 
 
0.415*** 0.408*** 0.408*** 
 
    
(2.680) (2.491) (2.492) 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
           
     Treat x Provincial Aggregator Connection   









    
(3.306) (3.044) (3.046) 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
           
Mean of DV in controls 0.191 0.191 0.191 
 
1.417 1.417 1.417 
 
0.085 0.085 0.085 
R-squared 0.026 0.218 0.241 
 
0.036 0.095 0.095 
 
0.008 0.019 0.019 
Stratum FEs No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
# Observations 459 459 459 
 
375457 375457 375457 
 
375457 375457 375457 
# Clusters         451 451 451   451 451 451 
Notes: The level of analysis corresponds to the level at which we observe the dependent variable. Columns (1) - (3) report OLS specifications estimated at the 
polling center level. Columns (4) - (9) are estimated at the candidate - polling station level. Correspondingly, robust (White) standard errors are reported in 
parentheses for columns (1) - (3) (not clustered since data are already aggregated to the polling center level) and robust standard errors are clustered at the 
polling center level in columns (4) - (9). Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The "additional covariates" are the number of military events 
within 1KM of the polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average response within the polling center 
catchment from our baseline survey fielded in August 2010 to whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general happiness (1-10), gender, 




Table 2: Summary Statistics       






        Employed (=1) 0.524 0.500 2403 
     Age (years) 32.500 12.221 2403 
     Female (=1) 0.469 0.499 2403 
     Married (=1) 0.690 0.463 2403 
     Education (years) 7.090 5.412 2403 
     General Happiness (1-10) 4.450 1.694 2403 
Beliefs: 
        MP Provides Services (=1) 0.196 0.397 2403 
     Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1) 0.674 0.469 2403 
     Voting Improves Future (=1) 0.610 0.488 2403 
     Gov. Ext. or Good Job of Prov. Serv. (=1) 0.456 0.498 2403 
     Impt to Rept IED to ANSF (=1) 0.934 0.248 2403 
     Police Should Resolve Disp (=1) 0.183 0.387 2403 
     Courts Should Resolve Disputes (=1) 0.082 0.274 2403 
     Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't (=1) 0.836 0.370 2403 
     Trust Afg. Gov. to Determine Guilt (=1) 0.529 0.499 2403 
Elections and Violence: 
        Military Events within 1KM 2.542 7.335 459 
     Visited by Int'l Monitor (=1) 0.163 0.369 459 
     Aware of Treatment (=1) 0.069 0.146 447 
     Election Returns Form Removed (=1) 0.135 0.342 459 
     Votes 1.391 8.436 375507 
     Enough Votes to Win Station (=1) 0.087 0.281 375507 
     Votes for Candidate Connected to Provincial 
Aggregator 24.276 49.375 1846 
     Enough Votes to Win Station (Connected to 
Aggregator) 0.447 0.497 1846 
Notes: Military event data are from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database. Data on international monitor visits are 
provided by Democracy International. Vote counts are from a web scrape performed on October 24, 
2010 of the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan website. Remaining data are from our 
endline survey fielded in December 2010. MP is a member of the national parliament. An IED is an 
improvised explosive device, generally a roadside bomb. ANSF are the Afghan National Security 
Forces, including police and military. The survey sample is restricted to the respondents who provide 




Table 3. Randomization Verification             
  
No 
Letter Letter Difference P-value # Control # Treatment 
Demographics: 
           Employed (=1) 0.573 0.557 -0.017 0.379 1198 1194 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019) 
        Age (years) 33.303 33.560 0.257 0.616 1198 1194 
 
(0.356) (0.368) (0.512) 
        Female (=1) 0.477 0.483 0.006 0.777 1198 1194 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) 
        Married (=1) 0.708 0.705 -0.003 0.897 1198 1194 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) 
        Education (years) 6.703 6.814 0.111 0.689 1198 1194 
 
(0.201) (0.192) (0.278) 
        General Happiness (1-10) 4.992 4.956 -0.035 0.773 1198 1194 
 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.122) 
   Beliefs: 
           MP Provides Services (=1) 0.164 0.151 -0.014 0.501 1198 1194 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.020) 
        Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1) 0.669 0.652 -0.017 0.499 1198 1194 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.025) 
        Voting Improves Future (=1) 0.683 0.696 0.013 0.617 1198 1194 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.026) 
        Gov. Ext. or Good Job of Prov. Serv. (=1) 0.547 0.579 0.032 0.281 1198 1194 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) 
        Impt to Rept IED to ANSF (=1) 0.959 0.972 0.012 0.184 1198 1194 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
        Police Should Resolve Disp (=1) 0.205 0.233 0.027 0.229 1198 1194 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023) 
        Courts Should Resolve Disputes (=1) 0.130 0.122 -0.008 0.657 1198 1194 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018) 
        Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't (=1) 0.851 0.859 0.009 0.664 1198 1194 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) 
   Elections and Violence: 
           Military Events within 1KM 2.759 2.618 -0.141 0.848 216 225 
 
(0.609) (0.416) (0.738) 
        Visited by Int'l Monitor (=1) 0.153 0.186 0.033 0.354 216 225 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.036) 
   Notes: Standard errors clustered at the polling center level reported in parentheses. Survey data are from the baseline 
survey fielded in August 2010. Military event data are from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database. Data on international monitor visits are provided by Democracy 
International. MP is a member of the national parliament. An IED is an improvised explosive device, generally a roadside 
bomb. ANSF are the Afghan National Security Forces, including police and military. The survey sample is restricted to 




Table 4: Effect of Treatment on Measures of Legitimacy---Primary Indices 
Dependent Variable: 
Perceptions of Government 
Index  
Compliant Behavior Towards 
Government Index 
 
All Outcome Index 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Delivered Letter (=1) 0.054* 0.059** 0.057** 
 
0.068*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 
 
0.062*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.021) 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
        
    Mean of DV in controls 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
0.009 0.009 0.009 
R-squared 0.002 0.125 0.152 
 
0.006 0.099 0.119 
 
0.007 0.090 0.118 
Stratum FEs No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
# Observations 2403 2403 2403 
 
2403 2403 2403 
 
2403 2403 2403 
# Clusters 459 459 459 
 
459 459 459 
 
459 459 459 
Standard errors clustered at the polling center level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Perceptions of Government 
Index is a z-score index of four dummy variables: MP Provides Services, Afghanistan is a Democracy, Voting Improves Future, and Gov. Ext. or 
Good Job of Prov. Serv. Compliant Behavior Towards Government Index is a z-score index of five dummy variables: Impt to Rept IED to ANSF, 
Police Should Resolve Disp, Courts Should Resolve Disputes, Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't, and Trust Afg. Gov. to Determine Guilt. All 
Outcome Index is a z-score index of all nine of these variables. The "additional covariates" are the number of military events within 1KM of the 
polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average response within the polling center catchment from 
our baseline survey fielded in August 2010 to whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general happiness (1-10), gender, marital 
status, and age. See Table 2 for an explanation of variables. The survey sample is restricted to the respondents who provide some response to the 
































































All Outcomes Index 0.009 0.061*** 0.000 
 
  (0.013) (0.017)     
Notes: Standard errors clustered at polling center level reported in parentheses. Significance levels (naive p-value) 
indicated by *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Treatment effects are standardized regression coefficients from a 
regression of the dependent variable, normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, on 
an indicator for treatment and stratum fixed effects. Indices take an average of all of the variables listed within the 
given hypothesis group, or across all nine variables in the case of the All Outcomes Index. P-values are corrected for 
multiple hypothesis testing as follows---we adjust across the two primary H1 and H2 indices to control the familywise 
error rate (FWER) computed following Westfall and Young (1993) and Anderson (2008); within each hypothesis 
group, we adjust to control the false discovery rate (FDR) computed following Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli 
(2006) and Anderson (2008). The survey sample is restricted to the respondents who provide some response to the 
questions corresponding to all nine variables. 
40 
	
Figure 1: Experimental Sample in Afghanistan
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Figure 2: Announcement of Monitoring 
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Appendix Table 1: Ensuring There is No Differential Attrition into Consistent Sample 
Dependent Variable: In Consistent Sample (=1) 
  (4) (5) (6) 
Letter Treatment (=1) -0.002 0.003 0.001 
 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.016) 
    Mean of DV in controls 0.800 0.800 0.800 
R-squared 0.000 0.159 0.199 
Stratum FEs No Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates No No Yes 
# Observations 3010 3010 3009 
# Clusters 462 462 462 
Standard errors clustered at the polling center level are reported in parentheses.  Data is from our 
endline survey fielded in December 2010. In Consistent Sample is equal to one for respondents who 
provide some response to the questions corresponding to all Beliefs variables reported in Table 2. The 
"additional covariates" are the number of military events within 1KM of the polling center, whether the 
polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average response within the polling center 
catchment from our baseline survey fielded in August 2010 to whether the respondent is employed, 



















Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics for Unrestricted Sample     




        Employed (=1) 0.492 0.500 3010 
     Age (years) 32.654 12.367 3009 
     Female (=1) 0.500 0.500 3010 
     Married (=1) 0.696 0.460 3010 
     Education (years) 6.593 5.470 3009 
     General Happiness (1-10) 4.382 1.724 3010 
Beliefs: 
        MP Provides Services (=1) 0.187 0.390 2965 
     Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1) 0.666 0.472 2706 
     Voting Improves Future (=1) 0.600 0.490 2763 
     Gov. Ext. or Good Job of Prov. Serv. (=1) 0.434 0.496 2900 
     Impt to Rept IED to ANSF (=1) 0.925 0.263 2930 
     Police Should Resolve Disp (=1) 0.173 0.378 2994 
     Courts Should Resolve Disputes (=1) 0.091 0.288 2994 
     Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't (=1) 0.831 0.375 3010 
     Trust Afg. Gov. to Determine Guilt (=1) 0.514 0.500 2907 
Elections and Violence: 
        Military Events within 1KM 2.619 7.517 462 
     Visited by Int'l Monitor (=1) 0.162 0.368 462 
     Aware of Treatment (=1) 0.066 0.135 460 
     Election Returns Form Removed (=1) 0.134 0.341 462 
     Votes 1.402 8.445 376893 
     Enough Votes to Win Station (=1) 0.087 0.282 376893 
     Votes for Candidate Connected to Provincial 
Aggregator 24.230 49.331 1850 
     Enough Votes to Win Station (Connected to 
Aggregator) 0.446 0.497 1850 
Notes: Military event data are from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Combined Information 
Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database. Data on international monitor visits are provided by 
Democracy International. Vote counts are from a web scrape performed on October 24, 2010 of the 
Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan website. Remaining data are from our endline survey 
fielded in December 2010. MP is a member of the national parliament. An IED is an improvised explosive 
device, generally a roadside bomb. ANSF are the Afghan National Security Forces, including police and 
military. The survey sample is restricted to the respondents who provide some response to the questions 
corresponding to all Beliefs variables. 
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Appendix Table 3. Randomization Verification for Unrestricted Sample 
  No Letter Letter Difference P-value # Control # Treatment 
Demographics: 
           Employed (=1) 0.566 0.556 -0.01 0.575 1410 1456 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
        Age (years) 33.291 33.577 0.285 0.547 1410 1456 
 
(0.335) (0.336) (0.474) 
        Female (=1) 0.5 0.5 0 1.000 1410 1456 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) 
        Married (=1) 0.706 0.71 0.004 0.815 1410 1456 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019) 
        Education (years) 6.462 6.565 0.103 0.699 1410 1456 
 
(0.193) (0.182) (0.266) 
        General Happiness (1-10) 4.949 4.913 -0.035 0.768 1410 1456 
 
(0.084) (0.086) (0.120) 
   Beliefs: 
           MP Provides Services (=1) 0.163 0.142 -0.021 0.259 1396 1440 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.019) 
        Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1) 0.655 0.643 -0.011 0.654 1286 1307 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.025) 
        Voting Improves Future (=1) 0.68 0.69 0.01 0.687 1339 1367 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) 
        Gov. Ext. or Good Job of Prov. Serv. (=1) 0.54 0.563 0.024 0.406 1384 1413 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.028) 
        Impt to Rept IED to ANSF (=1) 0.956 0.961 0.005 0.592 1390 1418 
 
(0.007) (0.006) 0.01 
        Police Should Resolve Disp (=1) 0.202 0.217 0.015 0.480 1410 1456 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) 
        Courts Should Resolve Disputes (=1) 0.14 0.133 -0.008 0.654 1410 1456 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018) 
        Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't (=1) 0.826 0.836 0.01 0.611 1410 1456 
 
(0.015) (0.014) 0.02 
   Elections and Violence: 
           Military Events within 1KM 2.747 2.617 -0.13 0.860 217 227 
 
(0.606) (0.413) (0.733) 
        Visited by Int'l Monitor (=1) 0.152 0.184 0.032 0.365 217 227 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.035) 
   Notes: Standard errors clustered at the polling center level reported in parentheses. Survey data are from the baseline 
survey fielded in August 2010. Military event data are from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database. Data on international monitor visits are provided by Democracy 
International. MP is a member of the national parliament. An IED is an improvised explosive device, generally a roadside 
bomb. ANSF are the Afghan National Security Forces, including police and military. 
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Appendix Table 4: Effect of Treatment on Measures of Legitimacy---Primary Indices, Unrestricted Sample 
Dependent Variable: 
Perceptions of Government 
Index  
Compliant Behavior Towards 
Government Index 
 
All Outcome Index 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Delivered Letter (=1) 0.049 0.056** 0.053** 
 
0.046** 0.045** 0.048** 
 
0.062*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
        
    Mean of DV in controls 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
0.009 0.009 0.009 
R-squared 0.002 0.126 0.156 
 
0.003 0.101 0.125 
 
0.007 0.090 0.118 
Stratum FEs No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
# Observations 2488 2488 2488 
 
2841 2841 2841 
 
2403 2403 2403 
# Clusters 459 459 459 
 
462 462 462 
 
459 459 459 
Standard errors clustered at the polling center level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Perceptions of 
Government Index is a z-score index of four dummy variables: MP Provides Services, Afghanistan is a Democracy, Voting Improves Future, and 
Gov. Ext. or Good Job of Prov. Serv. Compliant Behavior Towards Government Index is a z-score index of five dummy variables: Impt to Rept 
IED to ANSF, Police Should Resolve Disp, Courts Should Resolve Disputes, Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't, and Trust Afg. Gov. to 
Determine Guilt. All Outcome Index is a z-score index of all nine of these variables. The "additional covariates" are the number of military 
events within 1KM of the polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average response within the 
polling center catchment from our baseline survey fielded in August 2010 to whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general 




































































  (0.013) (0.017)     
Notes: Standard errors clustered at polling center level reported in parentheses. Significance levels (naive p-
value) indicated by *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Treatment effects are standardized regression coefficients 
from a regression of the dependent variable, normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation, on an indicator for treatment and stratum fixed effects. Indices take an average of all of the variables 
listed within the given hypothesis group, or across all nine variables in the case of the All Outcomes Index. P-
values are corrected for multiple hypothesis testing as follows---we adjust across the two primary H1 and H2 
indices to control the familywise error rate (FWER) computed following Westfall and Young (1993) and 
Anderson (2008); within each hypothesis group, we adjust to control the false discovery rate (FDR) computed 









Appendix Table 6: Treatment Effects on Who is Mainly Responsible for Delivering 
Services 












  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Delivered Letter (=1) -0.050 0.120** 0.043 -0.076** -0.022 
 
(0.044) (0.047) (0.046) (0.038) (0.045) 
 
     Mean of DV in controls 0.019 0.007 -0.033 0.008 -0.010 
R-squared 0.171 0.071 0.067 0.118 0.066 
Stratum FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 2403 2403 2403 2403 2403 
# Clusters 459 459 459 459 459 
Standard errors clustered at the polling center level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The "additional covariates" are the number of military events within 1KM of the 
polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average 
response within the polling center catchment from our baseline survey fielded in August 2010 to 
whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general happiness (1-10), gender, marital 
status, and age. See Table 2 for an explanation of variables. The survey sample is restricted to the 
respondents who provide some response to the questions corresponding to all nine legitimacy variables 






Appendix Table 7: Impact of Awareness of International Involvement 
Dependent Variable: 
Perceptions of Government 
Index  
Compliant Behavior Towards 
Government Index 
 
All Outcome Index 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Delivered Letter (=1) 0.061* 0.065** 0.062** 
 
0.084*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 
 
0.074*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.029) 
 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.022) 
 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
           Treat X Aware of Delivery -0.004 -0.011 0.004 
 
-0.027 0.000 -0.044 
 
-0.017 -0.005 -0.022 
 
(0.052) (0.049) (0.051) 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
        
    Mean of DV in controls 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
0.009 0.009 0.009 
R-squared 0.002 0.125 0.152 
 
0.006 0.099 0.119 
 
0.007 0.090 0.118 
Stratum FEs No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Additional Covariates No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
 
No No Yes 
# Observations 2403 2403 2403 
 
2403 2403 2403 
 
2403 2403 2403 
# Clusters 459 459 459 
 
459 459 459 
 
459 459 459 
Standard errors clustered at the polling center level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Perceptions of Government 
Index is a z-score index of four dummy variables: MP Provides Services, Afghanistan is a Democracy, Voting Improves Future, and Gov. Ext. or Good 
Job of Prov. Serv. Compliant Behavior Towards Government Index is a z-score index of five dummy variables: Impt to Rept IED to ANSF, Police 
Should Resolve Disp, Courts Should Resolve Disputes, Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp't, and Trust Afg. Gov. to Determine Guilt. All Outcome 
Index is a z-score index of all nine of these variables. The "additional covariates" are the number of military events within 1KM of the polling center, 
whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average response within the polling center catchment from our baseline 
survey fielded in August 2010 to whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general happiness (1-10), gender, marital status, and age. See 
Table 2 for an explanation of variables. The survey sample is restricted to the respondents who provide some response to the questions corresponding 
to all nine variables. 
 
